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133 
IS THERE A PLACE FOR RELIGION IN  
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING? 
Honorable Kermit V. Lipez
*
 
I first encountered the tension between judging and religion in 
a church, not a courtroom.  Shortly after I joined the Court of Ap-
peals in July 1998,1 I received an invitation to the “Red Mass for the 
Jurisdiction of Maine”2 from a committee of prominent Maine law-
yers and state judges, chaired by the Bishop of Portland.  The invita-
tion explained that the Red Mass ceremony dated back to the 13th 
century in Rome, Paris and London, where it was celebrated annually 
in October.  Judges, lawyers, government officials, and people of all 
faiths attend the Mass to invoke God’s blessing and guidance in the 
administration of justice.3  The invitation further explained that: 
[T]he traditional name of the Red Mass derives from 
the red vestments worn by the celebrants of the Mass.  
These red vestments symbolize the tongues of fire 
which indicate the presence of the Holy Spirit, as well 
as recalling the traditional bright scarlet robes worn by 
 
* Judge Kermit V. Lipez graduated from Haverford College in 1963 and Yale Law School in 
1967.  He earned his LL.M. from the University of Virginia School of Law in 1990.  Judge 
Lipez participated in the U.S. Department of Justice Honors Program as a Staff Attorney in 
the Civil Rights Division from 1967 to 1968.  He then served as Special Assistant and Legal 
Counsel to Maine Governor Kenneth M. Curtis from 1968 to 1971 and as a Legislative Aide 
for United States Senator Edmund S. Muskie from 1971 to 1972.  Judge Lipez worked in 
private practice in Portland, Maine from 1973 to 1985, before he was appointed Justice of 
the Maine Superior Court, where he served from 1985 to 1994.  In 1994, he was elevated to 
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, where he served until he was appointed to the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in 1998. 
1 “Judge Lipez was appointed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals in April 1998 and as-
sumed senior status on December 31, 2011.”  See Kermit V. Lipez, USCOURTS.GOV, 
http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/kermit-v-lipez (last visited Dec. 9, 2014). 
2 See Invitation from the Red Mass Comm. to Hon. Kermit V. Lipez (Aug. 1998) (on file 
with author). 
3 Judy Harrison, Bishop invokes God’s blessing for legal community at Red Mass in Port-
land, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Oct. 2, 2011), http://bangordailynews.com/2011/09/30/religion/ 
bishop-invokes-god’s-blessing-for-legal-community-at-red-mass-in-portland/. 
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the attending royal judges many centuries ago.4 
The last Red Mass in Maine had been held in 1957.5  The Red Mass 
Committee had decided to revive the tradition.6 
I had an immediate Establishment Clause reaction to this invi-
tation.  How could it be appropriate, I thought, for a federal judge to 
go to a Catholic Mass intended to invoke God’s guidance for my 
work?  How would a Muslim or a Baptist or a Jew feel about my par-
ticipation?  Could they reasonably see an endorsement of Catholic 
theology in my participation?  Yet I learned from the invitation, and 
confirmed by my own research, that justices of the Supreme Court 
had been participating in a Red Mass in Washington, D.C. for years.7  
Surely they had thought through the Establishment Clause issue.  So, 
with some misgivings, I went to the Red Mass. 
I had worried needlessly.  In a homily offered at the Mass, the 
Bishop spoke thoughtfully about the relationship between law and 
justice, describing the “inalienable rights” language of the Declara-
tion of Independence8 as consistent with the Catholic teaching that 
“[R]ights have their origin with a God who is creator of heaven and 
earth and all that is within them.”9 
Thus reassured, I returned for a second Red Mass in the fall of 
1999.  Justice Scalia was the Guest of Honor that year,10 and I had the 
privilege of sitting next to him in the front pew of the church.  That 
proximity created some awkwardness, however.  When Justice Scalia 
kneeled to pray, I felt that I was intruding on a private moment.  
When the Bishop urged us to turn to our seatmates, wish them peace, 
and embrace in an act of fellowship, I had a moment of panic.  Was I 
really supposed to embrace Justice Scalia?  What should I do?  For-
tunately, Justice Scalia was no more eager for an embrace than I was.  
Looking me in the eye with the hint of a smile, he said that shaking 
 
4 See supra note 2. 
5 Id. 
6 Harrison, supra note 3 (stating that the Red Mass was reinstated in 1998). 
7 Dan Merica, Record number of justices attends Red Mass, CNN POLITICS (Sept. 30, 
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/30/politics/fea-scotus-red-mass/. 
8 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with cer-
tain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”). 
9 Bishop Joseph Gerry, Homily at the Red Mass Celebrated at Holy Martyrs Church in 
Falmouth (Oct. 2, 1998), in CHURCH WORLD, Oct. 8, 1998, at 4. 
   
10
 Steven G. Vegh, Scalia to Attend Annual ‘Red Mass,’ PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Aug. 
28, 1999), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-22950908.html. 
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hands would be just fine.  So we shook hands. 
Then the Bishop delivered his homily.  This time it was dif-
ferent.  There was a partial birth abortion ban on the November ballot 
in Maine.11  In his homily,12 the Bishop addressed that controversy 
directly by elaborating on the inalienable rights language in the Dec-
laration of Independence: 
The truth about the human person is that it possesses 
fundamental and inalienable rights.  The truth about 
the human person is that its fundamental rights were 
inscribed in human nature itself, they are willed by 
God and therefore call for universal observance and 
acceptance.  No human authority can infringe upon 
them by appealing to majority opinion or political 
consensus, or in the pretext of respect for pluralism in 
democracy. . . . Those fundamental rights deserve to 
be protected and in your work with the law you are 
called upon, as well as privileged, to dedicate your-
selves to that task.13 
There was no mistaking the Bishop’s message.  He was telling his 
audience how they should vote in November, and the judges in par-
ticular how they should handle any abortion issues that came before 
them. 
I have not returned for a Red Mass celebration since that 1999 
event.  Although the Bishop had spoken eloquently about an issue of 
deep concern to him and nobody had forced me to attend the Red 
Mass, I could no longer avoid answering affirmatively the establish-
ment question that I had posed for myself when I was first invited to 
the Mass.  There was an appearance issue.  Maine citizens of other 
religious persuasions reading about the participation of their judges in 
the Red Mass, could reasonably worry that this participation was an 
endorsement of the religious views that they were hearing. 
Interestingly, 1999 was also the year that the annual Red 
Mass ceremony in Washington, D.C. sparked controversy.  With six 
Supreme Court Justices in attendance, and a case on the Supreme 
 
11 See Maine rejects ban on certain abortions, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 1999, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/vote99/v019.htm. 
12 Bishop Joseph Gerry, Homily at the Red Mass Celebrated at St. Patrick's Church in 
Portland (Sept. 24, 1999), in CHURCH WORLD, Sept. 30, 1999, at 4. 
13 Id. at 5. 
3
Lipez: Religion in Judicial Decision-Making?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
136 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
Court docket in December involving a challenge to the use of federal 
dollars to pay for school equipment used by parochial schools,14 
Bishop Raymond Boland of Kansas City delivered a homily lament-
ing the high level of separation between church and state and “calling 
on the audience to find new ways of legally facilitating those who 
work with Caesar and walk with God.”15  Rev. Barry Lynn of Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church and State criticized the sermon 
as “a blatant effort to lobby Supreme Court justices on [the Church’s] 
view of the Constitution.”16  Justice Ginsberg was one of the three 
justices not in attendance at that 1999 Red Mass.17  She refuses to go 
to any Red Mass because of what she described as an “outrageously 
anti-abortion” sermon on a prior occasion.18 
This Red Mass controversy highlights some of the complexi-
ties of the relationship between judging and religion.  Surely we can-
not fault Catholic judges on appearance grounds for participating in a 
religious service of their own church.  They are simply exercising 
their First Amendment right to worship as they choose.  But what 
about the explicit appeal from the pulpit at Red Mass services that 
judges use religious doctrine to decide a controversial issue like abor-
tion?  Under the Establishment Clause of our Constitution, that ap-
peal is as problematic for Catholic judges as it would be for any 
judges asked to decide controversial issues on the basis of religious 
doctrine.19  Indeed, when confronted with a divisive issue like abor-
tion, we are quick to declare that religion has no place in judicial de-
cision-making. 
I think that generality is suspect.  An issue like abortion 
clouds our view of the place of religion in judicial decision-making.  
The reality is that most judges have a religious identity, and it is un-
realistic to expect them to create a “wall of separation” between that 
identity and their decision-making.20  Indeed, I believe that religion 
 
14 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000). 
15 Tony Mauro, Sunday School: Captive Audience for Washington's Red Mass, LEGAL 
TIMES, Oct. 18, 1999, at 2. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Bill Mears, Red Mass: lobbying high court or simple prayer service?, CNN (Oct. 1, 
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/10/01/dc.red.mass/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2014). 
19 Id. 
20 This famous metaphor comes from the Supreme Court's decision in Everson v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Ewing TP, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 
164 (1878)). 
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already plays an unacknowledged part in judicial decision-making.  
Rather than pretending otherwise, we should acknowledge that fact 
and explore its implications. 
Some judges have written thoughtfully on this issue.  Judge 
Wendell Griffen, an Arkansas Court of Appeals judge who is also a 
Baptist pastor, rejects the notion that religious values have no place in 
judicial decision making.21  He writes: 
Instead of treating religious values as inherently sus-
pect when held by judges, or as automatically imper-
missible factors for influencing judicial decision-
making, we ought to honestly consider the way that re-
ligious values can operate within the decision-making 
process consistent with our views of pluralism and re-
ligious tolerance, tempered by our concern for the Es-
tablishment Clause . . . .22 
Judge Griffen’s challenge is an important one.  Judging is not always 
a search through familiar material for an answer just beneath the sur-
face.  Judges must often make decisions in the face of uncertainty, 
without the help of familiar guideposts.  Criminal and civil laws de-
fining acceptable conduct cannot anticipate every variety of human 
behavior.  By design or inadvertence, many statutes are ambiguous.  
If legislative history is unhelpful or non-existent, judges must infer 
legislative intent from multiple sources.  Science challenges legal 
norms defining the beginning and end of life.  Technology tests con-
stitutional generalities designed to protect our privacy against gov-
ernment encroachment. 
Judges must also make discretionary decisions in cases where 
the relevant factors are not tightly circumscribed.  Sentencing is a 
prime example.  There, the competing demands for mercy and retri-
bution, and the societal stake in protection from violent conduct and 
financial plunder, can try a judge’s soul. 
What are the proper sources of decisions for judges in such 
cases?  Does it make sense to say that only secular sources—
economic, political, philosophical, psychological, historical, and sci-
entific—can play a role in such cases, but religion cannot?23 
 
21 See generally Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values in Judicial Decision-
Making, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 513 (1998). 
22 Id. at 514. 
23 Judge Griffen raises a similar question.  See id. 
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I suggest that religion can appropriately play a role in such 
decision-making, so long as we are clear about some basic points.  
We all have life and educational experiences because of our religious 
identity.  These experiences impart values that influence our conduct 
and inform our judgments about the conduct of others.24  Religion 
makes us think about ultimate meanings and, in light of those mean-
ings, right and wrong, good and bad, fair and unfair.  If these reli-
gious experiences and values are widely shared across religious de-
nominations, they might be useful for judges looking for guidance in 
areas of legal uncertainty.  To the extent that these experiences and 
values are not widely shared, they will be a problematic source for 
judges trying to make decisions compatible with their judicial role. 
Thus, judges should not reject outright the usefulness or ap-
propriateness of their religious identity in their judicial decision-
making.  Instead, they should accept that their religious identity is 
part of who they are, and they should try to understand how that iden-
tity influences their decision-making.  If they try to distance them-
selves from their religious roots, they may disserve, even distort, their 
decision-making.  To make these generalities more concrete, I would 
like to draw on two decisions of a Jewish Supreme Court Justice and 
my own personal history as a Jew. 
In 1940, on the eve of World War II, Justice Felix Frankfur-
ter, the third Jew to serve on the United States Supreme Court, having 
been preceded by Louis Brandeis and Benjamin Cardozo, wrote a de-
cision for the Court in the case of Minersville School District v. Gobi-
tis.25  “Lillian Gobitis, aged twelve, and her brother William, aged 
ten, were expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsyl-
vania, for refusing to salute the [American] national flag as part of a 
daily school exercise” mandated by the local Board of Education, 
pursuant to state law.26  The Gobitis children, who were Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, had been taught that “the Bible, as the Word of God, is the 
supreme authority.”27  Thus, the salute, “a gesture of respect for the 
flag was forbidden by the command of Scripture.”28 
 
24 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “values” as, inter alia, “principles or standards 
of a person or society, the personal or societal judgment of what is valuable and important in 
life.”  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
25 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
26 Id. at 591. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 591-92. 
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With only one of the nine justices on the Supreme Court dis-
senting, Justice Frankfurter affirmed the authority of the school to 
expel the Gobitis children.29  Emphasizing that the flag was an im-
portant symbol of national unity, and that the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture had reasonably decided that a daily pledge of allegiance to the 
flag by school children would promote that unity, Justice Frankfurter 
wrote that judges should not, as he put it, “exercise censorship” over 
that legislative judgment.30  He saw the case primarily in institutional 
terms, writing at great length about the proper roles of the legislature 
and the judiciary in our system of government.31  He did not defend 
the wisdom of the Pennsylvania law.32  But, he wrote: 
[E]ducation in the abandonment of foolish legislation 
is itself a training in liberty.  To fight out the wise use 
of legislative authority in the forum of public opinion 
and before legislative assemblies rather than to trans-
fer such a contest to the judicial arena, serves to vindi-
cate the self-confidence of a free people.33 
Justice Frankfurter’s Gobitis decision was widely condemned by le-
gal scholars and editorial writers as an affront to civil liberties.34  
Three years later, in what is breathtaking speed for the Supreme 
Court, the Justices explicitly overruled the Gobitis decision in the 
case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.35  Taking 
its cue from the Gobitis decision, the West Virginia Board of Educa-
tion had adopted a resolution requiring all teachers and pupils in 
West Virginia’s schools to participate in a salute “honoring the Na-
tion” as represented by the flag.36  Again, the children of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in West Virginia faced expulsion from school because they 
refused to salute the flag.37  This time, the Supreme Court sided with 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses by declaring the West Virginia resolution 
 
29 Id. at 600-01. 
30 Minersville Sch. Dist., 310 U.S. at 596-97, 599. 
31 Id. at 599-600. 
32 See id. at 600 (holding that wise legislation is the best way to serve free peoples’ inter-
ests). 
33 Id. 
34 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 635 n.15 (1943) (stating that 
peoples’ civil liberties may be violated when courts make decisions based on religious be-
liefs). 
35 Id. at 642. 
36 Id. at 626. 
37 Id. at 629-30. 
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unconstitutional in a six to three decision.38  Justice Robert Jackson 
wrote, “[T]he action of the local [school] authorities in compelling 
the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on 
their powers and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is 
the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve 
from all official control.”39 
Justice Frankfurter was furious at this turnabout, accusing his 
six colleagues in a long, angry dissent of writing their “private no-
tions of policy into the Constitution.”40  He began his dissent with 
these now-famous words: 
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted 
minority in history is not likely to be insensible to the 
freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution.  Were my 
purely personal attitude relevant I should whole-
heartedly associate myself with the general libertarian 
views in the Court’s opinion, representing as they do 
the thought and action of a lifetime.  But as judges we 
are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor ag-
nostic.  We owe equal attachment to the Constitution 
and are equally bound by our judicial obligations 
whether we derive our citizenship from the earliest or 
the latest immigrants to these shores.41 
Justice Frankfurter’s statement about his Jewish identity was an unu-
sually personal one for a Supreme Court Justice.  He acknowledged 
that identity in his dissent only to assert its irrelevance to his work as 
a judge.42 
In one sense, that assertion of irrelevance is unassailable.  A 
judge cannot be faithful to the oath of office and ignore the law of the 
state in favor of religious doctrine.  For example, the Halacha, or 
Jewish law, has a more expansive concept of the Good Samaritan 
than our civil law, based on a passage from Leviticus 19:16: “You 
shall not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor.”43  The failure to 
rescue a drowning stranger is punishable by God if the rescue poses 
 
38 Id. at 642-44. 
39 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
40 Id. at 646-47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
41 Id. at 646-47. 
42 Id. at 647.  
43 MOSES MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH—THE BOOK OF TORTS, Laws of Murder and the 
Preservation of Life 1:14 (Hyman Klein trans., 1954) (citing Leviticus 19:16). 
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no substantial risk of serious harm to you.44  There is no similar legal 
duty to rescue under American law even if there is no such risk.45  If I 
as a judge had to decide a lawsuit against an indifferent stranger who 
failed to rescue a drowning child, I could not allow the Halacha’s 
treatment of the Good Samaritan to influence my view of the facts in 
the case or my judgment on the responsibility of the stranger. 
But the flag salute cases did not involve a rule of law with set-
tled content like the Good Samaritan law.  Justice Frankfurter and his 
colleagues had to give content to one of the great generalities of the 
Constitution—the protection in the First Amendment for the free ex-
ercise of religion.46  Confronted with the task of balancing that free 
exercise by Jehovah’s Witnesses and the demand of the government 
for a uniform expression of loyalty, Justice Frankfurter said that he 
could not allow his Jewish identity, or, as he put it, his membership in 
“the most vilified and persecuted minority in history,” to influence 
his decision in the case.47 
Justice Frankfurter’s position in his Barnette dissent raises 
troubling questions for Jewish judges who almost certainly share his 
awareness of this history of Jewish oppression.  In varying degrees, 
from our earliest awareness of our Jewish identity, we carry with us a 
sense of a tragic history.  Justice Frankfurter’s position becomes even 
more troubling for Jewish judges whose families have experienced 
persecution and discrimination. 
Believe it or not, I found recently a handwritten draft of my 
Bar Mitzvah speech, with my mother’s marginal notation, “Remem-
ber to thank your sister.”  But my mother did not have to remind me 
to thank my grandmothers, both escapees from religious persecution 
in Russia.  I wrote these words: 
As I look down into the always encouraging and hope-
ful eyes of my grandmothers, I see the one thing that I 
cherish most, love.  Their eyes have seen many more 
years than mine and they have seen all the terrible op-
pression and persecution that the Jews have had to suf-
fer in foreign lands.  Yes, they can appreciate this 
moment better than I ever could, but I know that they 
 
44 Sheldon Nahmod, The Duty to Rescue and the Exodus Meta-Narrative of Jewish Law, 
16 ARIZ. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 751, 758 (1999). 
45 Id. at 760. 
46 U.S. CONST. amend I. 
47 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 646-47 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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hope and pray that I will never have to see and experi-
ence what they have had to go through. 
For me, the long suffering of the Jewish people was embodied in the 
lives of my grandmothers, who both lived with us throughout my 
childhood. 
My father also told me about his experiences with anti-
Semitism.  He graduated from Penn Law School in 1929.  Unable to 
find work as a lawyer in Philadelphia in the wake of the Depression, 
he returned to his home in Lock Haven, Pennsylvania.  To his de-
light, he was soon offered a position as an associate in the office of 
an elderly attorney in nearby Williamsport.  Then, about a week later, 
the attorney called my father and said that he had to see him right 
away.  When they met, the attorney told my father that a number of 
the leading lawyers in Williamsport had warned the attorney that they 
never had a Jewish lawyer there, and they did not want one now.  
Although the attorney did not withdraw his offer to my father, he said 
that my father would have to fight for admission to the Lycoming 
County Bar Association, probably through a lawsuit.  Unable to af-
ford a protracted legal battle, my father decided to start his own law 
practice in Lock Haven.48 
About twenty-three years later, my father had another experi-
ence with anti-Semitism that I witnessed.  Appointed to fill the judge-
ship in Clinton County after the incumbent judge died, my father was 
running for a full term of his own in 1953.  He had been born in Rus-
sia, coming to the United States with his mother when he was two 
years old.  I had always enjoyed telling friends of that exotic fact—
my father’s Russian origins.  But the country was in the midst of 
McCarthyism in 1953.49  Soon my father heard that his opponent for 
the judgeship was spreading stories about the Jewish judge who 
might be a communist since he was born in Russia and, besides, eve-
rybody knows that Jews are communists.50  Fortunately, this cam-
paign of hate and innuendo badly backfired, and my father easily won 
election to the judgeship. 
These experiences with anti-Semitism prompted my parents 
and my grandmothers to give me some advice: “Always be your own 
boss.  Don’t be at the mercy of others for your work.”  As they saw it, 
 
48 ABRAHAM H. LIPEZ, RECOLLECTIONS OF A COUNTRY JUDGE 81-2 (Nuttall ed. 1993). 
49 See generally Irving Louis Horowitz, Culture, Politics and McCarthyism: A Retrospec-
tive from the Trenches, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 357, 357 (1996). 
50 LIPEZ, supra note 48, at 158. 
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being Jewish made one vulnerable to whim and prejudice.  It was 
wise to make choices that minimized those vulnerabilities.  I am sure 
that this advice influenced my decision to go to law school.  Law, un-
like some careers, offered possibilities for independence.  Law is also 
central to the exercise of power in our society and the response to it, 
offering protection against governmental excess and discrimination, 
such as the discrimination experienced by my father in Williamsport.  
I remembered that my father, if his financial circumstances had al-
lowed it, could have sued the Lycoming County Bar Association for 
its outrageous anti-Semitism. 
I made other choices that I believe were influenced by my Ju-
daism.  I spent the summer after graduating from college in 1963 
working with minority children at settlement houses in New York 
City.  That same summer I went to the March on Washington for Jobs 
and Freedom, where Dr. King made his historic “I Have a Dream” 
speech.  After my first year of law school, I spent the summer at 
Dillard College in New Orleans teaching English composition cours-
es to young African-Americans who needed academic enrichment to 
improve their chances of getting into college.  For my first job after 
law school, I worked in the Civil Rights Division of the Department 
of Justice, enforcing in the South the newly enacted Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. 
These choices were more organic than calculated.  I just felt 
that I should do these things.  Also, there was nothing unusual about 
these choices.  Many Jews were drawn to civil rights activism, seeing 
in the experiences of African-Americans in this country echoes of the 
Jewish experience throughout history. 
So is Justice Frankfurter right?  Are my Jewish identity and 
the values it instilled problematic for me as a judge?  Should I insist 
on their irrelevance to my judicial decision-making, as Justice Frank-
furter did, lest I violate the spirit of the Establishment Clause? 
To answer that question, I cite the controversy surrounding 
the nomination of Sonia Sotomayor, the first Hispanic on the Su-
preme Court.51  Justice Sotomayor had been a judge on the lower fed-
eral courts before being nominated to the Supreme Court.52  In a 
speech about her work as a judge, she had expressed the hope that “a 
wise Latina with the richness of her experiences would more often 
 
51 Kathryn Abrams, Empathy and Experience in the Sotomayor Hearings, 36 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 263, 265 (2010). 
52 Id. 
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than not reach a better conclusion than a white male judge who hasn’t 
lived that life.”53  Without using the word, Justice Sotomayor de-
scribed the empathy that the “wise Latina” judge might feel for some 
of the parties before her.54  Empathy has been defined as “a feeling of 
affinity, whether based on experience or imagination, that permits 
one a full, sometimes visceral understanding of what another is going 
through.”55  In nominating Justice Sotomayor, President Obama stat-
ed that “among [her] virtues was a set of life experiences that would 
permit her to empathize with parties who had experienced disad-
vantage.”56 
This focus on empathy generated some sharp criticism of Jus-
tice Sotomayor and President Obama.  As one critic put it: “[W]hen a 
judge shows empathy toward one party in a courtroom, do they not 
show prejudice against the other?”57 
That is an important question.  Whatever their life experiences 
might have been, judges cannot use them to disregard statutory com-
mands, clear precedents and the probative force of evidence.  But, as 
I have suggested, many judicial decisions are interstitial—that is, 
they fill in gaps where the statutory or constitutional law is so gen-
eral, or the common law doctrine is so dated, that the judges must 
give the law content by deciding specific cases.  Some of these cases, 
like the flag salute cases, require the application of the protections of 
the Bill of Rights to the conduct of the government.  Judges decide 
these cases through a process that is a mix of logic, analysis, intuition 
and common sense, all informed by the judge’s education, work his-
tory and, yes, a religious identity that instills certain values.  If those 
values prompt a judge to be more forgiving of human frailty, or more 
alert to abuses of governmental authority, or more generous in fash-
ioning relief, or more tolerant of inarticulate claims of discrimination, 
that is not a demonstration of prejudice.  It is a demonstration of the 
inescapable reality of judging. 
I have no doubt that my experiences as a Jew have influenced 
my judicial decision-making.  My concerns about racial injustice 
 
53 Id. at 263. 
54 Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge's Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002). 
55 Abrams, supra note 51, at 268. 
56 Id. at 263. 
57 Sen. Jeff Sessions, Guest Commentary: 'Empathy' no basis for judicial rulings, THE 
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, July 13, 2009, http://www.mlive.com/opinion/grand-rapids/index.ssf/ 
2009/07/guest_commentary_empathy_no_ba.html. 
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translate readily to concerns about the treatment of other vulnerable 
individuals or groups.  I recognize that the courts allow challenges to 
power, public or private, that are unavailable elsewhere.  I believe 
that undue deference to governmental authority is unwise. 
Let me be clear, however.  I make no claim for Jewish excep-
tionalism.  Obviously, one does not have to be Jewish to care about 
minority rights or abuse of government power.  Indeed, that is my 
basic point.  These concerns, though traceable to my history as a Jew, 
are widely shared.  Empathy can have many sources, including the 
teachings of most religions.  My point is that a judge should not resist 
experiences and values traceable to a religious identity when those 
experiences and values might legitimately enhance the quality of the 
judge’s work. 
This was Justice Frankfurter’s great failing in the flag salute 
cases—his rejection of the relevance of his experiences as a Jew to 
the plight of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Note this unfeeling descrip-
tion in his Barnette dissent of the stakes in these cases for the chil-
dren expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag.  The dissent 
states, “We have not before us any attempt by the State to punish dis-
obedient children or visit penal consequences on their parents.  All 
that is in question is the right of the state to compel participation in 
this exercise by those who choose to attend the public schools.”
58
  By 
contrast, Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in Barnette, quoted a 
scholar’s tart observation about Justice Frankfurter’s earlier decision 
in the Gobitis case: “All of the eloquence by which the majority [in 
Gobitis] extol the ceremony of flag saluting as a free expression of 
patriotism turns sour when used to describe the brutal compulsion 
which requires a sensitive and conscientious child to stultify himself 
in public.”59  Justice Jackson saw the stakes in the flag salute cases 
that Justice Frankfurter missed—the plight of a young Jehovah’s 
Witness child forced to make a public choice between conformity and 
religious conviction. 
Although Justice Frankfurter’s career was admirable in many 
respects, his insistence on the irrelevance of his experience as a Jew 
to the plight of the Jehovah’s Witness children in the flag salute cases 
led to a serious misjudgment.60  There was no incompatibility be-
 
58 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 650 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. at 634-35 n.15 (quoting Robert E. Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1939-40, 35 AM. 
POLIT. SCIENCE REV. 250, 271 (1941)). 
60 ROBERT A. BURT, TWO JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISE LAND 45 (1988). 
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tween Justice Frankfurter’s Judaism and his judicial oath to uphold 
the Constitution if, sensitized by his experience as a Jew to the plight 
of minorities, he had ruled that the school authorities in Pennsylvania 
could not compel the children of Jehovah’s Witnesses to salute the 
American flag.  Indeed, there was an appropriate convergence be-
tween his experience as a Jew and the protection of minority rights in 
the Bill of Rights.  As one commentator has noted, by guarding 
against an empathy borne of his experience as a Jew, Justice Frank-
furter pushed himself into “an alliance with the vilifiers and persecu-
tors.”61 
There is a cautionary tale here for judges who must give con-
tent to the generalities of a constitutional provision or statute, fashion 
remedies for which there are few guides, or apply multi-factor tests 
that maximize a judge’s discretion.  Although there are traditional 
sources of guidance available to judges struggling with these difficult 
cases, there is no reason to exclude from the mix a judge’s religious 
experiences or values.  Indeed, judges who attempt to erect a wall be-
tween their judicial decision making and their religious identity risk 
depriving themselves of sensitivities that may be important to the 
quality of their work. 
However, I add an important caveat.  As I suggested earlier, 
any reliance on religion in judicial decision-making must only in-
volve values that are both protective of minority rights under the 
Constitution and widely shared in the society.  Any use of religious 
doctrine to resolve controversial social or cultural issues that find 
their way into the courts would be incompatible with our pluralistic 
society and contrary to the Establishment Clause. 
I also must acknowledge a complication that I have thus far 
avoided.  How public should judges be in explaining the influence of 
religious experiences or education in their decision-making?  As a 
practical matter, this question would arise only for trial judges ex-
plaining their decisions, or for appellate judges writing a concurrence 
or a dissent.  An appellate judge writing a decision on behalf of a 
court could not offer such insight into individual decision-making.  
Still, even with that limitation, the question is an important one. 
Interestingly, when Justice Frankfurter circulated his dissent 
in Barnette to colleagues, Justice Murphy urged him to delete the ref-
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such an unusual personal statement.62  Justice Frankfurter, as he ex-
plained in his diary, told Justice Murphy that he was not worried: 
I said I could understand that a reference to the fact 
that I am a Jew would be deemed to be personal if I 
drew on that fact as a reason for enforcing some mi-
nority rights. . . .  But I do not see what is “personal” 
about referring to the fact that although a Jew, and 
therefore naturally eager for the protection of minori-
ties, on the Court it is not my business to yield to such 
considerations . . . .63 
Despite his belief that it was appropriate to explain why his religion 
did not affect his decision-making, Justice Frankfurter’s personal 
statement was seen as odd, and it intensified the criticism of his dis-
sent.  Judges acknowledging that religion influenced their decision-
making might suffer even greater criticism.  We are in unfamiliar ter-
ritory here. 
I suggest that the question of transparency about the role of 
religion in judicial decision-making turns on the centrality of any re-
ligious consideration to the judge’s decision.  If I was a trial judge 
considering the employer’s motion for summary judgment in an em-
ployment discrimination case involving claims of religious prejudice, 
and those claims resonated with me, in part, because of my father’s 
experience with anti-Semitism, I would see no need to acknowledge 
that fact in any decision that I wrote, so long as that history did noth-
ing more than impel a scrupulous examination of the record for genu-
ine issues of material fact.  After all, that is what a trial judge should 
do anyhow.  Also, there would be many other factors at work in such 
a decision, including the traditional legal ones applicable to a motion 
for summary judgment.  What would matter would be my self-
awareness about the role of my personal history in my decision-
making, the discipline to preserve my impartiality, and the interplay 
of my history with the craft skills of judicial analysis and reasoning 
that should ultimately control the decision.  In short, the religious his-
tory would only be background that heightened my awareness of the 
stakes in the case. 
On the other hand, if I faced a difficult sentencing decision–
 
62 Id. at 44. 
63 Id. (quoting Justice Frankfurter in J. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 
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say a vehicular manslaughter case where an alcoholic mother had 
killed her own child, and I realized that prescriptions of mercy from 
my religious education were overcoming in my mind the demands for 
deterrence and punishment, I would owe the public an acknowledg-
ment of that influence in the explanation of my sentencing decision.  
Mercy is a legitimate part of the sentencing process.  Religious values 
could reasonably inform its application.  However, if the transparen-
cy revealed undue reliance on those values, there would be correc-
tives available in our system of judicial review and checks and bal-
ances. 
In closing, and in summary, I must take issue one last time 
with Justice Frankfurter.  He wrote in his Barnette dissent that “as 
judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnos-
tic.”64  He was wrong.  Judges do not lose their religious identity 
when they become judges, any more than Justice Sotomayor lost her 
identity as a Latina woman when she became a judge.  We remain the 
sum of all our parts.  Those parts inescapably influence our work as 
judges.  What matters is our awareness of those influences, how we 
use them, and, at times, explain them.  We should accept the truth 
that a judge’s religion affects judicial decision-making and engage in 
an ongoing discussion about it. 
 
 
64 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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